Bottom-Up State Building: Preventing violence at the community level
The identification of a strong relationship between fragility and violence clearly implies that reducing violence is essential to reducing fragility.
“We are our own officials in this neighborhood. We are our own authority. [The local and national authorities] only show up when they want something from us! For us, they don’t exist.”
—Focus group participant, Cité Soleil, Port-au-Prince, Haiti 1
The quote above expresses a sentiment that is increasingly familiar: in many places across the developing world, the state simply does not exist. In these contexts, we speak of a “failed state,” in the sense that the state fails its citizens by not providing them with the most basic services. Among these—and perhaps the most fundamental—is the provision of security. Where there is no security, violence can have free rein.
Violence, then, is not a cause of fragility, but it is an important indicator of a fragile situation. Indeed, as shown in Figure 1, there is a positive, significant relationship between fragility and homicide rates. This observation holds not only for countries involved in formal conflict or recent post-conflict, but also in countries that have made the transition to peace.
Violence and fragility reinforce each other in several ways. On the most basic level, violence erodes governance by creating fear that limits mobility and participation. In more intense situations, high levels of violence can create under-governed areas where state institutions are unable to enter and provide services, further undermining state legitimacy. In the most extreme cases, fragile contexts offer safe havens for organized criminal networks to operate freely. These networks may grow strong enough to compete with the state in the provision of core public goods, especially security, thereby undermining state legitimacy.
The identification of a strong relationship between fragility and violence clearly implies that reducing violence is essential to reducing fragility. Only when a minimum level of security has been established can the state perform its function as service provider. In addition, a basic situation of security is necessary to provide the space for citizens to safely and constructively engage with the state. In sum, a minimum level of security is essential for rebuilding a strong relationship between citizens and the state. Yet establishing security is only one element in reducing violence. As we will argue here, it is necessary to go beyond basic security to address the real economic and social exclusion faced by many residents of fragile states, in order to secure development in the long term.
The question for development practitioners, then, is how to contribute to violence prevention that will allow for institutional strengthening in fragile situations? There is a growing consensus that violence-affected communities themselves are an important part of the answer. Below we present two distinct examples—Haiti and Kenya—that illustrate the relationship between state fragility and violence, and the importance of community level interventions in reducing both.
Building institutions from the community up: Perspectives from
Port-au-Prince
The experience of Haiti illustrates the ways state fragility and violence can mutually reinforce each other. Figure 2 charts homicide rates, the most reliable indicator for levels of violence, and notes the periods of social and political unrest that have accompanied different surges in violence. With the institutional vacuum following the departure of President Jean Bertrand Aristide in early 2004, the country witnessed alarming rates of violent crime. The following years were marked by periodic outbreaks of violence, many of which coincide with state failure to adequately respond to political and social unrest. For example, the spikes in violence from mid-2004 to late 2006 stem from the state’s indecisiveness in dealing with urban gang activity in certain “lawless zones” of the capital, culminating in the UN military intervention in Cité Soleil at the end of 2006. The peaks in 2008 coincide with a weak institutional response to rising food prices, exemplified by the resignation of Prime Minister Edouard Alexis in April, followed by further unrest as the state struggled to respond to the impacts of the four hurricanes that hit the island last fall.
Communities in Haiti continuously list basic security as a top concern and a precondition for strengthening the weakened state. In Port-au-Prince, a hot spot for violence, a strong UN presence has reduced violence in recent years, yet residents see this relative calm as temporary and tenuous. In Cité Soleil, one of the most violent neighborhoods in Haiti and the focus of UN peacekeeping efforts, violent crime victimization remains high, with 33 percent of residents reporting having been victimized. Although gangs are less active than before, their presence is still visible, and their power latent. As one focus group participant remarked, “[The UN mission] has decapitated some of the gangs but the roots remain. Many young people are waiting for the opportunity to get involved.”
The response from Cité Soleil residents has been to call, first, for a stronger police and UN presence, followed by stronger justice institutions to promote rule of law and, finally, more economic opportunities to secure the peace. 2
But beyond a stronger police presence, Cité Soleil residents felt that ensuring security depends on promoting reconciliation and rebuilding community relationships. The release of former gang members from prison without any formal reconciliation process has raised tensions in the community. Even though it is not explicitly aimed at violence prevention, a World Bank community-driven development project in Cité Soleil has been an important step in helping to rebuild relationships by bringing community members together to identify priorities collectively, and implement development projects. Stronger support to these community-driven processes is one of the more promising avenues to securing the peace in the long term.
Perspectives from Nairobi
Kenya, unlike Haiti, is a country that ranks in the middle of many of the fragile state index classifications. Kenya has experienced strong economic growth in recent years and was considered by many to be a good example of peace and democratic stability in Eastern Africa, a region known for long-lasting ongoing conflicts—Sudan and Northern Uganda—and total state failure as is the case of Somalia. However, despite its economic progress, Kenya has been faced with capacity problems to deliver basic services to citizens, in particular, to those living in the poorest areas.
The eruption of the post-election violence in 2007, in which more than a thousand people were killed in a matter of days and thousands more forcefully displaced shattered Kenya’s image as a stable democracy. The extreme brutality of the violence committed during the much contested election was triggered by underlying structural factors, including rising inequality, mounting poverty, limited access to basic resources by the poor, high unemployment—particularly among youth—, persistent insecurity, and widespread corruption. These factors exacerbated the magnitude and brutality of violence during these elections, the most severe since Kenya’s return to multi-party politics.
These underlying issues created a fertile ground for violence to erupt and therefore, raise questions about Kenya’s institutional and political stability. Failure by intelligence agencies to recognize early warning signs on increasing tension in some areas of the country and poor coordination with security agencies such as the Kenya police and Administration police also contributed to the rapid spread of violence.
State institutions have generally been weak in Kenya, particularly in the poorest communities, where most of the violence took place. For example, in Nairobi, the vast majority of the population lives in slums, with poor physical infrastructure, limited access to water and poor sanitation. Other basic services such as access to justice and provision of safety and security by the police force are weak in urban settings and practically nonexistent in rural areas. The latter is important because the lack of effectiveness of these institutions has spurred the growth of non-state security actors who, in most cases, provide the security needed in these areas. Some of these groups such as the Mungiki and others that operate freely in these areas have strong political ties. In fact, according to the “Waki report,” they were used as politically motivated vehicles for violent acts during the post-election period. 3
Most of the violence and insecurity that emerged during the 2007 national election had been brewing for years in these poor communities. Despite experiencing formidable levels of growth, the sudden surge of violence in 2007 did signal that institutional performance in Kenya is still weak. Recent work on crime and violence in poor urban areas in Nairobi reveals that citizens in these communities demand more state presence and more access to basic services such as water and sanitation, better housing infrastructure and decent access to justice and the rule of law. Building resilience in these communities to reduce the probability of the viral spread of violence experienced during the post-election period can be achieved through broader development policies at the level of the community. As long as there is abject poverty, increasing levels of inequitable growth, high unemployment, and limited institutional presence, poor communities will continue to be breeding grounds for surges of violence, such as the one experienced during the post-election period.
Policy orientations
Some basic insights can be gleaned from these experiences. First and foremost, there is a strong relationship between state fragility and high levels of violence. The incapacity of the state to ensure basic security of its citizens undermines governance and creates opportunities for non-state criminal groups to supplant the state. Thus, reducing violence is an essential aspect of reducing fragility overall.
Communities represent a key entry point for these efforts. Citizens’ confidence in the security and justice systems as the principal means for dispute resolution creates an important opportunity for interventions in those sectors.
Beyond basic security, the root causes of violence and fragility, that is,the social and economic marginalization residents face, must be addressed.Promising approaches include World Bank Community Driven Development processes, which can serve as a forum for community reconciliation and consensus building on local development. Also, support for basic service provision in violence hot spots can be a means to bring the state presence back into under-governed areas, helping to rebuild state legitimacy in violence-affected communities. By linking violence prevention and institutional strengthening, development institutions can go a long way toward arresting the cycle of violence and poverty that holds vulnerable communities back from sustainable development.
Erik Alda and Alys M. Willman are members of the Conflict, Crime and Violence team, Social Development Department, The World Bank. This paper has greatly benefited from the constructive comments from Alexandre Marc, Coordinator of the Conflict, Crime and Violence team.
Endnotes
1 This quote and those that follow are taken from a focus group conducted in Cité Soleil in August 2008 by the Interuniversity Institute for Research and Development (INURED).
2 Fieldwork is part of a global study of urban violence being conducted by the Conflict, Crime and Violence team (SDV) to be published later this year.
